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NOTE
EXAMINING PRESIDENTIAL POWER THROUGH THE
RUBRIC OF EQUITY
Eric A. White*
In this Note I propose a method to examine presidents' actions
taken outside the normal bounds of executive power by employing
the general rubric of equity, in an attempt to find when the presi-
dent acts with what I term "practical legitimacy." This would be a
new category for executive actions that, while perhaps arguably il-
legal, are so valuable that we want to treat them as legitimate
exercises of executive power To do so, Ifirst examine the history of
equity, noting the many relevant parallels to our modern conception
of executive power In light of these parallels, I argue that the reso-
lution of the dispute over equity's legitimacy warrants application
in the executive-power context. I then focus on the rules and stan-
dards of one equitable remedy-the preliminary injunction-to
fashion a framework by which to test executive action for practical
legitimacy. Finally, in an effort to make clear how this novel test
ought to be applied, I apply this framework to three historic exer-
cises of questionable executive power: Jefferson's purchase of the
Louisiana Territory, Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus, and Truman's seizure of the steel mills.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans have long debated the proper scope of executive power.'
Most reasonable people believe that there are circumstances that allow-
indeed, may even compel-the executive to act in ways that at first glance
would seem to be at odds with the Constitution, though even these people
disagree as to when this can be done, and exactly what justifies it. This in
turn raises a number of questions, which the scholarly literature on the sub-
ject attempts to answer. Should the resort to something like "prerogative
power"2 be exercisable only in an emergency?3 If so, what constitutes an
emergency?4 Is an executive prerogative power contained in the Constitu-
tion, somewhere in Article II-perhaps implied in the vesting clause or
commander-in-chief clause?5 Is this power extraconstitutional, such that its
exercise depends on the president throwing himself on the mercy of the
people to justify his actions post-hoc? 6 Or is it more a pragmatic question of
institutional conflict, in which the answer lies in examining how well the
executive action fits within our concept of separation of powers?'
These are interesting, complex questions. But instead of focusing on
these questions of why the president can act, this Note focuses on when we
think he should. To be sure, the reason why the president has prerogative
power goes a long way in determining when he can use it; it sets at least the
outer boundaries. At the same time, it seems in reality the distinction be-
tween the three modes described above-that conclude either that
prerogative power is constitutional, extraconstitutional, or a question of in-
stitutional conflict-is not as great as their conceptual differences would
1. See, for example, the discussion of Jefferson and the Louisiana Territory at Section
III.A., infra. See generally SAMUEL KERNELL & GARY C. JACOBSON, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 242-58 (2d ed. 2003).
2. Mark Elliott defines prerogative power acutely as "a legal form of non-statutory power."
MARK ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 172 (2001).
3. See, e.g., James McDonald, Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?, 93
VA. L. REV. 1785, 1792-94 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality
of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1069 (2008) ("[The]
emergency power must, in a constitutional democracy, be tightly circumscribed.").
5. See, e.g., Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., The Modem Doctrine of Executive Power, 17 PRESI-
DENTIAL STUD. Q. 237 (1987).
6. See, e.g., LouIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 248-50 (4th ed., rev., Univ. Press of Kan. 1997); Donald L. Robinson, Presidential Pre-
rogative and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 114 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996).
7. See, e.g., George Thomas, As Far as Republican Principles Will Admit: Presidential
Prerogative and Constitutional Government, 30 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 534 (2000).
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lead us to believe. In any given case, it is quite likely the justifications for a
particular executive action would come from a vague clause within Article
II, an appeal to the populace, and a practical assessment of how the other
branches of government would respond.'
This Note demonstrates the surprising degree of similarity between the
role of executive prerogative power vis-a-vis the Constitution and the his-
toric exercise of equitable power vis-a-vis the common law. It also shows
the practical insights that can be gained by applying rules and standards
from the law of equity to the analysis of executive prerogative power.9 In
particular, looking at modem executive power through an equitable lens is a
useful way of gauging when the president acts with what I term "practical
legitimacy." The idea behind focusing on practicality in our analysis of le-
gitimacy is that we recognize that some executive actions, though arguably
un- or extraconstitutional, are so valuable that we would rather treat them as
legitimate exercises of executive power than not have the president act at
all.' o Perhaps if the president's action rises to the level of practical legiti-
macy it ought to fall into a third category between the traditional dichotomy
of explicit constitutional justification on the one hand and a fall back on
extraconstitutional justification gained through ex post ratification by Con-
gress or the people on the other. There would be a gray area in the middle,
in which the practical legitimacy of the president's action means that even if
he might not be able to claim plausibly to have acted constitutionally he
could claim some justification to which the public ought to defer, and would
thereby avoid more rigorous public judgment with its attendant hindsight
bias.
Certainly, the idea of recognizing unconstitutional executive actions as
legitimate will strike some as strange at best, scary at worst. But is there any
doubt that presidents are going to continue to push the constitutional
boundaries of their power?" How much better, then, to have a framework
8. For a classic consideration of this, see John P. Roche, Executive Power and Domestic
Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative, 5 W. POL. Q. 592 (1952). And add to this list an appeal to
precedent and the president's reliance on it. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 472-73 (1915) ("[Glovemment is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers,
law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive
Department--on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often
repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.").
9. Of course, this is not to say that the relationship between the crown and courts in a thir-
teenth-century England that predates our written constitution should control our constitutional
interpretation of executive power. Nor is it to say that the modem black-letter law of equitable re-
medies should be employed as a means of interpreting the Constitution. Rather, it is merely to show
that running the question of executive prerogative power through an equitable analysis is an infor-
mative way of thinking about presidential power in practice.
10. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) ("[Piractical [can be
defined as] ... available, usable, or valuable in practice or action ... [as opposed to] theoretical,
ideal, speculative.").
It. See, e.g., Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.conlposts/
1226441587.shtml (Nov. 11, 2008, 17:13 EST) (describing the similarly broad executive-power
aspirations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and predicting more of the same from Barack Ob-
ama). And, can there be any doubt that there are some instances where the public would not only
accede to the exercise of such power, but would want to encourage it?
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that political scientists, historians, members of the public, and even execu-
tive branch staffers and officials themselves can use to evaluate these
instances, providing some semblance of rules where there currently are
none?'
2
To that end, this Note proceeds as follows: Part I considers the historical
relationship between law and equity, argues that there is an important con-
ceptual similarity with modem questions of executive power, and, in light of
this similarity, calls for adapting the equity court's resolution of the dispute
over its legitimacy through self-limiting principles to the executive-power
context. Part II lays out the equity framework, adapting this analysis to the
context of presidential power to show what benefits can be gained from do-
ing so. Finally, to show how this equitable test can be used in a foreign
context, Part III applies the framework to three historic exercises of execu-
tive power: Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory, Lincoln's limited
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and Truman's seizure of the steel
mills, ultimately concluding that only Lincoln's action meets the test for
practical legitimacy.
I. LAW AND EQUITY
The historical relationship between British common law courts and the
court of equity bears many similarities to the role executive prerogative
power plays in our constitutional system. Section L.A focuses on the history
of equity, discussing the source of equitable power and its highly debated
initial legitimacy. It also identifies and analyzes the practical role the "law of
equity" played in the British judicial system, where, when circumstances
demanded, equity provided a flexible escape from an increasingly rigid legal
system. Section I.B discusses the relevant parallels between the source of
and justification for the historical exercise of equitable power and the cur-
rent exercise of presidential power in the United States. Specifically, it
describes how some once questioned the legitimacy of the king's exercise of
power through the equity courts in much the same way that some today
question the exercise of the president's power when acting in gray areas. It
argues that these parallels warrant applying an equitable analysis to the ex-
ecutive-power context, suggesting that the president might resolve the
dispute over the legitimacy of his actions by limiting the deployment of his
extraordinary remedies in much the same way that the equity court did:
through the adoption and implementation of a self-limiting framework.
12. There are myriad uses for the test. For instance, members of the executive branch could
apply it ex ante when trying to decide whether to take a particular action. Or Congress could apply it
ex post in evaluating the propriety of a president's action. Or yet still academics and even members
of the public could apply it ex post to determine whether particular executive actions were justified.
Indeed, though this framework is not a legal one per se, in that it could never displace a court's
constitutional or statutory analysis, it could even be useful to judges in simply trying to understand
the practical dimension of a president's decision to take a questionable action. It essentially calls for
a paradigm shift in how we, in whatever role we play, evaluate the propriety of executive actions.
[Vol. 108:113
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A. Equity in History
1. Evolution of Equity: Source and Legitimacy
Just as with executive prerogative power today, many contemporaries
questioned'-and many historians continue to question14-the source and
legitimacy of the equitable power historically exercised by British mon-
archs. English monarchs played an instigating role in the development of the
modern common law system. In the sixth century, Ethelbert, King of Kent,
promulgated legal rules designed to bring some sense of uniform order to a
society governed almost exclusively by customary local laws.'5 The dispute
resolution at that time consisted largely of the blood feud. The Laws of
Ethelbert outlined the legitimate uses of that practice and created many ex-
ceptions to it, laying the groundwork for its gradual demise. 6 Five centuries
later, William the Conqueror continued the trend of nationalizing the legal
system, bringing much of the authority under his royal power. 7 Henry I
expanded upon this nationalization in the eleventh century, by which time
the judicial system in England was fragmented between an informal court of
equity, known as Chancery, 8 and two courts at common law, known as
King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. Essentially, the king created
a relatively uniform common law system but also retained in the monarchy
his own ability to adjudicate disputes.
With the Magna Carta in 1215 and the gradual shift of monarchical leg-
islative authority to Parliament and monarchical judicial authority to the
common law courts, the continued source of the king's equitable power be-
came highly questionable." In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, clashes
13. For example, Lord Justice Coke was one such prominent critic. EW. MAITLAND, EQ-
UITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 9 (2d ed. 1936).
14. See, e.g., Thomas G. Barnes, Due Process and Slow Process in the Late Elizabethan-
Early Stuart Star Chamber, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 221 (1962).
15. THEODORE FT. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 142-45 (5th ed.
1956).
16. See generally BILL GRIFFITHS, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY ENGLISH LAW: THE LAW-
CODES OF ETHELBERT OF KENT, ALFRED THE GREAT, AND THE SHORT CODES FROM THE REIGNS OF
EDMUND AND ETHELRED THE UNREADY (1995).
17. Reginald A. Wilkinson, The Emergence of Restorative or Community Justice in the Unit-
ed States, in 2 FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: CODDLING OR COMMON SENSE? 52 (Claudia Whitman et al.
eds., 1998) ("William the Conqueror developed a legal system for centralizing power and accruing
funds."); see also Yale Law School, The Avalon Project, Statutes of William the Conqueror,
http://avalon.yale.edu/medieval/lawwill.asp.
18. Historians generally refer to the court of equity during its early period as simply Chan-
cery. This is in distinction to the Court of Chancery, a more regularized version of that body that was
established during the reign of Richard H] (1367-1400). See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103 (4th ed. 2002) ("It seems probable that the English jurisdiction was
established in its distinct form during the reign of Richard II, since already by 1393 there were
complaints of its abuse."). For a general history of the increasing power of national monarchies in
the High Middle Ages, with a focus on England, see R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF
THE MODERN WORLD 33-35 (7th ed. 1992).
19. See generally H. Brent McKnight, How Shall We Then Reason? The Historical Setting of
Equity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 919 (1994).
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between the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Chancery became
commonplace. 20 At times common law and equity would even conflict di-
rectly. For example, in 1368, common law judges at Chelmsford voided a
commission granted by the Royal Courts, saying that it violated the defen-
dant's due process rights. 2' Forty years later, a judge on the common law
Court of Common Pleas went so far as to foreclose a resort to equity, stating
that "the king has committed all his judicial powers to [the common law]
courts. 22 Apparently the King disagreed: that same year, the Chancery, sit-
ting in equity, stepped in to overturn a common law decision.
Against critics, the monarchy argued that the due process statutes Par-
liament passed throughout this period could not deprive the king of the
ability to exercise his duty to make sure that justice was served. To justify
their continued role, kings pointed to such sources of power as the royal
coronation oath, in which, for example, Edward II swore "to do equal and
right justice and discretion in mercy and truth."24 Thus, Edward II argued,
the ability to provide equity in contradistinction to the common law courts
inhered in the executive by virtue of his sovereign duty, which the parlia-
21
ment and other courts could not touch . Similarly, monarchs pointed to
practical reasons for the continued role of their equitable power. After all,
they argued, they alone had the ability, when "the regular procedures proved
deficient[, to] ... furnish a remedy.' 26 The argument followed that it must be
true, then, that "[t]he king ... retained an overriding residuary power to ad-
minister justice outside the regular system. 27
2. The Equity Escape Route
The principle virtue of equity was the flexible escape route it provided.
As one seventeenth-century chancellor put it, equity was necessary because
"men's actions are so diverse and infinite that it is impossible to make a
general law which may aptly meet with every particular and not fail in some
circumstances. 2 ' By this time, the common law courts had been around a
great while, and over the years common law procedure had become increas-
20. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 18, at 108-09. But see W. J. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN
COURT OF CHANCERY 418-22 (1967) (arguing that the Court of Chancery operated relatively cohe-
sively alongside common law courts within the Elizabethan legal system).
21. BAKER, supra note 18, at 97 & n.2.
22. Id. at 97 (quoting Chedder v. Savage, Y.B. Mich. 8 Hen. 4, fol. 12, pl. 13 (1406)).
23. BAKER, supra note 18, at 97 & n.4.
24. Id. at 98 (quoting Coronation Oath of Edward II in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 168
(John Raithby ed., 1819)).
25. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 97-98.
26. Id. at 98.
27. Id. It should be noted that it was very much disputed at the time whether "equity" existed
outside the legal system, or whether it was a corrective force on the common law built into the sys-
tem. See generally id.




ingly rigid.' 9 For instance, it was perfectly normal for plaintiffs wishing to
sue defendants for negligence to bring an action in trespass vi et armis alleg-
ing an intentional, forceful assault upon the body-not because an
intentional assault was actually committed, but because they were required
to by the Court of Common Pleas' rules to bring suit.3° The common law
courts simply lacked the will to update court procedure to accommodate the
many new forms of action then arising.3' Indeed, in some cases litigants
could not even manipulate the pleas to get into common law courts. For
such actions as disputes over ordinary contracts,32 negligence,33 and nui-
sance,34 there was for a long time simply no common law remedy at all.
Frustrated litigants were not shut out of the adjudicative system entirely,
however. They could3 -and increasingly did 36-turn to the Court of Chan-
cery, which had the power to issue new writs and hear actions "on the
case." 37 Once in court, litigants found that the Chancery also followed dif-
ferent rules. Pleading a case in common law courts often meant reciting
established text and "observing strict rules of evidence, rules which might
exclude the merits of the case from consideration. 38 In contrast, "[t]he
chancellor was free from [these] rigid procedures .... His court was a court
of conscience, in which defendants could be coerced into doing whatever
conscience required in the full circumstances of the case., 39 An increasingly
complex distinction between matters of law and fact, and with it an
29. BAKER, supra note 18, at 106.
30. See, e.g., Buckton v. Tounesende (The Humber Ferry Case), YB. 22 Lib. Ass. 4, fol. 94,
pl. 41 (1348) translated in PLUCKNETT, supra note 15, at 470. This can be distinguished from an
action in trespass on the case. See, e.g., The Miller's Case YB. 41 Edw. 3, fol. 24, pl. 17 (1367)
("Writ of Trespass sur le case."), translation paraphrased in BU School of Law, Legal History: The
Year Books, available at http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/lawyearbooks/display.php?id=1 3785.
31. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, INVITATION TO LAW 65-76 (1988).
32. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1184, 222 (1895) (noting that it took common law courts centuries to
adapt writs of trespass to enforce ordinary contracts).
33. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen. 4, fol. 18, pl. 6 (1401) translated in Mark F.
Grady, The Negligence Dualism (UCLA School of Law 2009 - Working Paper Series), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1337275 (including a remarkable line from
Thiming, C.J.: "It is better that he should be utterly undone than that the law be changed for him.").
34. See the discussion on the development of the assize of novel disseisen in BAKER, supra
note 18, at 423-24.
35. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 102 & n.24 ("nullus recedat a curia cancellariae sine
remedio"; trans., "no one should leave the Chancery in despair" (quoting YB. 21-22 Edw. I, 323
(1284) (Bereford, C.J.))).
36. EDWARD JENKS, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 143-45 (Burt Franklin Press,
1970) (1898).
37. Generally, if an action were "on the case" it meant that it was not an action sounding in
one of the established original writs. See MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 360-61, 384.
38. BAKER, supra note 18, at 103.
39. Id.; see also 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 467 (3d ed., rewritten
1922) ("In early days there were no fixed principles upon which the Chancellors exercised their
equitable jurisdiction. The rule applied depended very much upon the ideas as to right and wrong
possessed by each Chancellor.").
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increasingly complex and expensive system of procedure, 40 had no place in
the Court of Chancery. And while the Court of Common Pleas was famous
for its long docket, "[t]he Chancery was always open .... It could sit any-
where, even in the chancellor's private house; and causes could be tried out
of court by commission of dedimus potestatem to country gentlemen[, and
therefore] ... provide swift and inexpensive justice. 41
B. Comparisons with Modern Executive Power
The king's claim of equitable power, and the historical role for a "law of
equity" has implications in the modem debate over the source of and justifi-
cation for executive power, and suggests a means of legitimating some
controversial exercises of executive power. The debate over the source and
legitimacy of the king's use of equity is in many ways similar to the modem
debate over the source and legitimacy of the presidential prerogative power.
The clashes that existed between the courts of equity and common law are
not unlike the periodic clashes between the executive and legislative
branches when Congress feels that the president is encroaching on its ter-
rain.42 The institutions that felt their power was being infringed upon pointed
to a lack of an explicit mandate for the monarch's actions taken under the
label of equity. Indeed, they cited language that seemed to suggest that the
monarch did not have these powers.43 Many courts and third parties were
also critical of the role of equity in the Middle Ages, fearing that the king's
equitable justice was an end run around the newly minted right of due proc-
ess.44 Likewise, members of Congress and other critics today question
executive prerogative power on the grounds that it supposedly has no
40. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rylands, (1865) 3 H & C 774, 159 Eng.Rep. 737; Fletcher v. Ry-
lands, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (Ch.); Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.)
(note the number of appeals, culminating at the House of Lords, for what would today be a simple
nuisance action); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 195-218 (1995)
(describing the increasingly prohibitive cost of litigation in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century
Britain). Admittedly, as it aged, the Court of Chancery by necessity had to develop its own (less-
rigid) version of the common law courts' procedure, and as a result it became more costly and time
consuming to litigate there. See, for example, the amusing illustration of the Chancery case that had
gone on so long nobody could remember when it began in CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Ni-
cola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books, 2003) (1853).
41. BAKER, supra note 18, at 103-04.
42. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During
the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1451 (1997) (describing various battles between
Congress and presidents from Washington to Jackson); Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo,
The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 667 (2003)
(describing various battles between Congress and presidents from Van Buren to Cleveland); Chris-
topher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1 (2004) (describing various battles between Congress and presidents from Harrison
to FDR); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modem Era, 1945-2004, 90 IowA
L. REV. 601 (2005) (describing various battles between Congress and presidents from Truman to
George W. Bush).
43. See e.g., BAKER, supra note 18 & n.1 (citing 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354), as representative of
due process statutes passed in the late Middle Ages, and the Magna Carta of 1215).
44. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 18, at 97-102.
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explicit or implied source,45 and many have further leveled the charge that
the prerogative power infringes on civil liberties such as due process. 4 And
just as the British monarch did to justify his exercise of equitable powers
hundreds of years ago, the president often counters these critics by arguing
that he has inherent or implied powers vested in his office.47
The historic law of equity and the modem presidential prerogative pow-
er also share a common functional justification: they both provide for
pragmatic alternatives to established procedure in special circumstances.
Just as the courts of equity provided "escape routes" from common law doc-
trine when justice required, the prerogative power allows the president to act
outside of what many perceive to be the normal bounds of his power when it
is necessary that he do so. Indeed, the use of equity as a flexible alternative
to the unbending system of common law justice should remind one a great
deal of many justifications for the executive prerogative power.48 Just as the
common law was perfectly well suited to handle the majority of matters, and
49equity, even in its heyday, was the exception, the prerogative power is not
touted as a tool to be employed on a regular basis.50 Instead, the prerogative
power exists to provide the president the ability to effectively opt out of con-
stricting institutional structures when necessary to do so.5' That is to say, the
45. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 491-92 (1915) (Day, J., dis-
senting) ("There is nothing in the Constitution suggesting or authorizing such augmentation of
executive authority or justifying him in thus acting in aid of a power which the framers of the Con-
stitution saw fit to vest exclusively in the legislative branch of the Government."); David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine,
and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 730, 737-39 (2008) (examining the Article II
commander-in-chief powers in the context of conflicting congressional intent and reviewing argu-
ments finding those powers generally unavailing, even in a time of war).
46. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, Judicializing Federative Power, 11 ITEX. REV. L. & PoL.
283, 301 (2007). See generally Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional Stretch, Snap-Back, and Sag:
Why Blaidsell Was a Harsher Blow to Liberty than Korematsu, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279 (2005).
47. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 78-90 (2007) (describing gener-
ally the views of executive power held by George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Alberto Gonzalez, and
David Addington).
48. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 67, 70 (2006); Mansfield, supra note 5.
49. See McKnight, supra note 19, at 929.
50. See, e.g., DANIEL P. FRANKLIN, EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES: THE EXERCISE OF PRE-
ROGATIVE POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) (advocating an "objective standard" to determine
when the exercise of presidential prerogative is lawful); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 206 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ'g Co., 1947) (1689) ("[H]e that will look into the
history of England will find that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best
princes, [for it was] visible the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public.");
David Gray Adler, George Bush and the Abuse of History: The Constitution and Presidential Power
in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 91 (recognizing that some degree of
prerogative power might exist, but chastising Bush for his broad interpretation of the executive's
inherent power); Martin S. Sheffer, Does Absolute Power Corrupt Absolutely?, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 233, 252 (1999) ("[Tlhere are times in our history when the President ... must act[] beyond
constitutional constraint.").
5 1. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1231
(Merril D. Peterson ed., 1984) ("A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the
highest duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation,
of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.").
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modem executive prerogative power is essentially akin to an extraordinary
remedy, something to be used sparingly when the situation requires.
Consequently, just as the rules fashioned by courts of equity properly re-
solved the historical conflict between the executive and law courts, the
limits that are the result of the natural progression of these same equitable
principles can be employed to resolve modem disputes over the scope of the
executive prerogative power. As Edward II's coronation oath attests to, the
king had a royal duty "to do equal and right justice and discretion in mercy
and truth" for his subjects.52 But as we have seen, the ossified procedural
rules employed by the courts of common law meant justice was in fact hard
to come by there, especially in novel disputes.53 The creation of a court of
equity fused the sovereign's equitable powers with the regularized admini-
stration of law. But the equity court did not in turn supplant the common law
courts. Instead, the equity court developed limiting rules to govem when it
would provide relief.54 Medieval chancellors rightly regarded themselves as
reinforcing, rather than undermining, the law by providing exceptional re-
medies for exceptional cases.5 And as more litigants began to seek equitable
remedies, the Chancery adapted sensibly by moving from what was
essentially an ad hoc approach to its equitable jurisdiction, to one that util-
ized its own set of limiting procedures5 6 -over time, actually fortifying the
legitimacy of the "law of equity. 5 7 To be sure, the precise form of equity's
self-limiting principles evolved, at first as a matter of following equitable
58precedent within the equity court, and later as a matter of common law
when equitable principles were adopted into law by law courts.5 9 It is, after
all, the nature of the common law and of equity itself to evolve. But the dis-
52. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
53. See supra notes 29-34.
54. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 109-10. For an interesting discussion of the limiting rules
established by the turn of the twentieth century for one such equitable remedy, the injunction, see
MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 354-65. Of course, there are many other equitable remedies with their
own limiting rules. For modem examples, take the irreparable-injury rule that the party seeking an
injunction must satisfy in order for a court to grant a permanent injunction. Shyamkrishna Balga-
nesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 593, 639-43 (2008). Or the "exceptionally high standard of proof' and
general unavailability of the reformation remedy. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 521, 568 (1982).
55. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 104-05; F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 225-26 (1913) [hereinafter MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]; MAITLAND,
supra note 13, at 6-10.
56. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 109-10. See generally MAITLAND, supra note 13 (describ-
ing the number of complex doctrines created by equity). But even these procedures were still more
flexible than those used in the contemporary law courts. BAKER, supra note 18, at 110-11.
57. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 109-11; MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra
note 55, at 466.
58. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 19.
59. See, e.g., Hill v. C.A. Parsons Ltd. (1971) 3 All. E.R. 1345, 1359 translated in BAKER,
supra note 18, at 113-15 & n.93, 202-04 ("[l]t is the common lawyers who now do equity.").
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tinguishing feature of a self-constraint on power can still be seen in the equi-
table remedies provided by American courts today.6°
Since, as I have argued, the problems associated with the historical de-
velopment of equity are remarkably similar to the problems associated with
the modem exercise of prerogative power, we should expect equity's solu-
tion to achieve the same agreeable result in the executive-power context.
More specifically, to the extent equity is a guide in determining the scope of
the executive prerogative power, we can expect a self-limiting principle
similar to that employed by the court of equity in construing its power vis-A-
vis courts of law to yield a similar legitimating effect in this new context.
Chancellors came "not to destroy the law, but to fulfil [sic] it.' 6 Their power
in practice was not ascendant62-though without self-constraint, by its very
nature it could have been.63 Instead, it stood alongside the power of the
courts of law 64 until it was ultimately legitimated through absorption into
law. 6' Likewise, a president's equitable exercise of his prerogative power
need not make Congress irrelevant. By viewing executive power through the
lens of equity, we can provide the president with added flexibility to act, and
yet still discern limits on the exercise of that power that will increase its per-
ceived legitimacy.
60. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-
8 (3d ed. 2002). As Professor Laycock describes, where statutes provide courts the power to grant
injunctive relief, justices split as to how best to interpret the phrase "equitable remedies": as reme-
dies available to equity preceding the merger of law and equity, or more broadly as remedies
"typically available in equity." Id. at 8 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)
(holding the latter interpretation to be the correct one)); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co.
v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). But this technical difference is not important for our purposes, for
even a focus on remedies typically available in equity necessarily brings with it equity's traditional
limiting principles. See, e.g., L.A. Coliseum Comm. v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200
(9th Cir. 1980) (discussing the role of the "fundamental principle[s]" of equity in the preliminary
injunction context).
61. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 17; see also id. at 258 ("Chancery never claimed any supe-
riority over the Courts of Common Law.").
62. See id. at 17 ("[Nlow and again there had been conflicts .. . [between law and equity;
e.g.,] when Coke was for indicting a man who sued for an injunction. But such conflicts as this
belong to old days, and for two centuries before the year 1875 the two systems had been working
together harmoniously.").
63. It is not difficult to imagine in theory a court of conscience free from law making more
rigid courts of law practically obsolete. This is particularly true of such novel equitable remedies as
the injunction. After all, the injunctive remedy "was far more flexible, far more generally applicable
[than equitable decrees for specific performance], and thereby it obtained not merely certain particu-
lar fields of justice, but a power of making its own doctrines prevail at the expense of the doctrines
of the common law." MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 318; see also BAKER, supra note 18, at 103-04.
And yet, despite an initially unsure relationship, the two systems ultimately did not collide. See
supra note 62.
64. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 104-10.
65. See, e.g., JOHN MCGHEE, SNELL'S EQUITY 715 (30th ed. 2000) (describing the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854). Notably, even though this statute and its progeny actually gave the law
courts broader ability to provide equitable remedies such as the injunction, the courts continued to
apply traditional limiting principles. See MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 258-60 (discussing the Judi-
cature Act of 1854 and the Judicature Act of 1875); McGHEE, supra, at 715 (citing Day v.
Brownrigg, (1878) 10 Ch.D. 294, 307) (describing these principles).
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II. THE EQUITABLE FRAMEWORK
Eventually, the principles of equity were assimilated into the common
law,6 along with combinations of rules and standards to govern when equi-
table remedies could be invoked. Examining executive forays into areas
normally left to Congress in terms of equity allows us to borrow some of
these established rules and standards, derived over time through equity's useof sef-liitin " " 67
of self-limiting principles, to set a boundary on this type of executive au-
thority.
The preliminary injunction framework provides the best guidance. Ex-
perience suggests that executive action is most often questioned in situations
in which time is of the essence and the executive needs to act quickly to
prevent a wrongful act from occurring. 6s This sounds most like a situation in
which equity deploys the preliminary injunction remedy to prevent immi-
nent harm before adjudication.
This Part focuses on the rules and standards governing preliminary in-
junctions, and translates this general framework into one that can be used to
analyze the president's exercise of the prerogative power. In particular, we
can apply the general rule behind the grant of a preliminary injunction to
ask whether the executive action in question was designed to prevent an
event from occurring that would disrupt the status quo. If the answer is yes,
then we can turn to the standards that govern whether a court should grant a
preliminary injunction in the particular case to ask whether the executive
was justified in acting outside the normal boundaries of procedure.
A. Preliminary Injunctions
There is, of course, some degree of diversity among common law coun-
tries, and even among courts within the United States, when it comes to the
rules and standards for granting preliminary injunctions. 0 Nevertheless,
there are enough similarities to make some general conclusions. First, be-
fore reaching the question of whether a preliminary injunction is warranted
in a particular case, courts make a threshold determination of whether the
situation before them is amenable to a preliminary injunction remedy. Sec-
66. In England, the Court of Chancery gradually closed up shop in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury due to a series of Parliament bills that fused common law courts with courts of equity. On the
earliest of these, see the discussion in BAKER, supra note 18, at 114, of the Common Law Procedure
Act of 1854. Of course, after incorporation into the common law, equity lost some of what made it
unique. See id. at 111-13.
67. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
68. See infra Part III.
69. The injunction is in many ways the quintessential equitable remedy. See, e.g., John
Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2007). The
preliminary injunction in particular is useful for examining use of the prerogative power because of
its unique features: for example, the temporal aspect aligns nicely because in both situations the
would-be actor is asking for the ability or justification to act quickly to prevent a damaging result.
70. Compare, e.g., Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1432-35 (7th Cir.
1986), with Power Test Petroleum Distribs., Inc. v. Calcu Gas, Inc., 754 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1985).
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ond, courts go through the gritty analysis of determining whether relevant
factors counsel in favor of granting the extraordinary relief.
The threshold rule for preliminary injunctions is that the requested relief
be designed to "maintain the status quo and preserve the controversy for a
meaningful decision after full trial."'" There is a remarkable degree of simi-
larity across American courts,72 and even across common law countries,73
with regard to this requirement. Perhaps this should not be surprising. After
all, when a court "enjoins" someone, it is "prohibiting" or "restraining" him
74from acting. Yet, the focus on preserving the status quo is not merely a
matter of semantics; there are practical justifications as well. Because the
preliminary injunction is granted before the trial, "if the defendant wins on
the merits, there is a certain embarrassment at having to undo an act com-
pelled by the court itself. 7 5 In addition to prescribing caution generally,76
this uneasiness supports recognizing a distinction between preventing an act
from occurring-an act that might effectively prevent a trial on the matter-
and actually mandating that a particular act occur. Unsurprisingly, courts
have often said that the latter situation lies outside their equitable powers to
. . . . . 77
grant preliminary injunctions.
71. KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES & MATERIALS 223 (5th ed. 1992); see also
ELAINE W. SHOBEN & WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 160 (2d ed.
1995) ("A plaintiff must convince the court that an interlocutory order is necessary to preserve the
status quo pending trial because otherwise irreparable harm will result."). There is considerable
debate about the utility of the status quo rule and a heightened focus on irreparable injury. See gen-
erally Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109
(2001); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule
Threaten the Warren Court's Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1372-
83 (2002). But the merit behind continuing to use a "status quo rule" or a heightened threshold
determination of "irreparable injury" in preliminary injunction analysis is beyond the purposes of
this Note. Rather, this Note is concerned with importing the limits in the preliminary injunction
doctrine as they now exist.
72. See generally SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 71, at 159-71; YORK ET AL., supra note 71, at
223-27.
73. See, e.g., I.C.F. SPRY, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES 446-94 (6th ed. 2001)
(describing the "status quo" element of "interlocutory injunctions" in Australia). Furthermore, this
feature is not a relatively new one. Courts were talking about the requirement that the remedy
sought was to maintain the status quo back when it was referred to in Latin, statu quo. See, e.g.,
Preston v. Luck, (1889), 27 Ch.D. 497, 505 (Cotton, L.J.) ("[T]he object of [an interlocutory injunc-
tion] is to keep things in statu quo.").
74. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 570 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "enjoin").
75. YORK ET AL., supra note 71, at 229.
76. Because, of course, it can also be somewhat embarrassing for a court to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction to a party and then later find for the opponent after trial. Nevertheless, there is a
difference--even if just a matter of degree. For example, consider a situation in which the court
compels a party not to take action X, then finds for him at trial, after which the party can take action
X. Compare this to a situation in which a court compels him to take action Y before trial, then finds
for the opponent and has to try to reverse action Y. In terms of pure logic, it is actually not unlike the
act versus omission distinction in criminal law. See Lee, supra note 71, at 159-61 (discussing the
theoretical economic-model merit of distinguishing cases based on whether or not there was a dis-
ruption in the status quo).
77. See, e.g., Jenkins v. BellSouth Corp., 491 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2007); Kikumura v.
Hood, 467 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2006). But see, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 348 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[There is] little
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The threshold rule of preliminary injunctions is just that: a threshold-a
hurdle the party must jump before the really determinative analysis can be-
gin. After all, showing that a court's preliminary injunction would
temporarily alleviate the situation is not the same as showing that the court
should actually grant one. This second stage of analysis is not as clear-cut as
the first. Here, the court employs standards instead of a firm rule, attempting
to balance subjective factors. 78 Even at this stage, however, courts have
largely coalesced around the same basic factors in deciding whether to grant
an injunction.
Courts consider four factors when determining whether to grant a pre-
liminary injunction: (1) how serious the potential harm is to the movant, (2)
how likely the harm is to result, (3) how the movant's harm without an in-
junction compares to the opponent's harm with one, and (4) how all this
affects the public interest.7 9 In practice, courts give differing weight to the
various factors. Some courts talk of following the "traditional test," in which
the party seeking the preliminary injunction must show a set number of fac-
• 81tors--either all of them,s° or a specific combination. Other courts are more
flexible, and employ what is called the "alternative test.' s2 Here, the factors
are the same, but instead of viewing each one as an up-or-down, all-or-
nothing part of the analysis, the court looks at all the factors together on a
sliding scale.83 Under this view, for instance, "the greater the potential ir-
reparability of the harm and the clearer the balance of hardships without the
order, the lesser the required showing of strength on the merits of the
case., ,"
consequential importance to the concept of the status quo. ). See generally YORK ET AL., supra
note 71, at 223-25.
78. Of course, balancing brings with it the possibility of a certain analytical wishy-
washiness. See, e.g., Scott A. Freedman, An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The Second Circuit's
Blanket Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in Clarett v. NFL, 45 SANTA CLARA L.
REV 155, 159 (2004) ("The problem with such an approach, as Justice Harlan noted in his dissent
[in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)], is the 'obvious danger' that the
Court's balancing invites the oft-feared result of 'judicial legislation.' "). But wrestling with subjec-
tive factors is bound up in the concept of equity. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 102-03; supra
Section I.A.
79. This restatement of the factors is often referred to as the "quadripartite test." See, e.g.,
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) (employing the four parts of the
traditional test and finding interim relief appropriate).
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See, e.g., Power Test Petroleum Distribs., Inc. v. Calcu Gas, Inc., 754 F.2d 91,95 (2d Cir.
1985) ("[Moving party] must show: (1) irreparable harm, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success
on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them fair grounds for
litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the movant.").
82. SHOBEN &TABB, supra note 71, at 171.
83. See, e.g., Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).
84. SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 71, at 171. There is diversity within the approaches, too. To
take just one example, the Seventh Circuit reduced the alternative test to an equation in the mold of
the Hand formula. See Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1432-35 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding that the underlying idea of whether to grant a preliminary injunction is "to minimize er-
rors"). The court employed the following formula: P x Hp > (l-P) x Hd to grant, where P is the
probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial, Hp is the harm caused to the plaintiff by a denial of
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Whichever method is employed, the court at least theoretically has a
significant amount of leeway in determining whether the situation calls for a
preliminary injunction. In determining how high to set the bar, the court
could easily be pulled in opposite directions. Take for instance the fact that
the court does not have the benefit of a full trial when it is making its deci-
sion. This lack of information might lead the court to look more favorably
upon the proponent's request because it can effectively stop the clock on a
potentially wrongful action and thereby preserve the status quo until trial.85
Or it might lead the court to look more disfavorably upon the request, for
fear that issuing the preliminary injunction will be tipping its hand in one
86party's favor before even hearing the merits.
In practice courts have by and large showed reluctance to grant requests
for preliminary injunctions, limiting the availability of this remedy. Thus,
we hear of courts talking about the need for "extraordinary circumstances," '87
and saying that merely "some anguish and some economic hardship '88 is not
enough. Nonetheless, courts are more than willing to use the preliminary
injunction when they feel it warranted. 9 The trick is to find the right balance
of factors to solve the "intractable problem" 9 of preserving the controversy
"while protecting the defendant from the severity and harshness of an order
granted after less than a full hearing."9'
B. A Framework for Executive Action
The two-part preliminary injunction framework can be employed to ex-
amine executive actions taken on matters normally dealt with by Congress.
Just as a preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy," the president's
exercise of this kind of power is extraordinary in that he is deviating from
normal procedure. Nevertheless, surely there are situations that call for this
type of action; the task is to find a reasonable, relatively flexible, and nor-
matively appealing way of delineating when that time is.
Modifying the preliminary injunction framework to fit the subject matter
of executive action achieves this by providing a two-part test: first, an initial
the injunction, I-P is the inverse of the probability the plaintiff will prevail at trial, and Hd is the
harm caused to the defendant by granting the injunction. Id. This model was first articulated by a
court in Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1984) (Pos-
ner, J.); see also John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525,
540-42 (1978) (suggesting this economic framework).
85. See SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 71, at 159-60.
86. See YORK ET AL., supra note 71, at 223. But see Lee, supra note 71, at 110 ("[T]he
heightened standard is historically and theoretically unsound, and ... circuits that adopt a uniform
standard have the better approach.").
87. Williams v. State Univ. of N.Y., 635 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (E.D.N.Y 1986).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Invesco Institutional (N.A.), Inc. v. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ky.
2007); Julia M. v. Scott, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (W.D. Mo. 2007); NaturaLawn of America, Inc. v.
West Group, LLC, 484 F. Supp. 2d 392 (D. Md. 2007).




threshold rule, and, second, a set of factors to be weighed to determine if the
particular action was legitimate. In particular, we can create something akin
to a model rule:
(1) Was the executive action in question designed to prevent an event from
occurring that would disrupt the status quo?
92
(2) If so, does a consideration of relevant factors surrounding the decision
to act weigh in favor of the president taking such action? Factors to
consider include:
(i) Was there a substantial likelihood that Congress would endorse the
president's action? 9'
(ii) Was there a substantial threat of irreparable damage or injury if the
president had not acted?94
(iii) Did the balance of harms weigh in favor of the president? 95
(iv) Was the president's action taken in the public interest?96
Just as it does in preliminary injunction analysis, the first prong sets out
a firm threshold rule governing the action. In this case, the president's action
must have been designed to prevent a disruption in the status quo. That is to
say, to move on to the second stage of the analysis, the president could not
have acted to bring about an affirmative change, but rather must have acted
to prevent an affirmative change from occurring. This distinction is norma-
92. Cf, e.g., id. ("Pretrial injunctions ... maintain the status quo and preserve the contro-
versy for a meaningful decision after full trial.").
93. Cf, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) (taking into
account the "likelihood of success on the merits"). This formulation to some degree assumes, as
would often be the case, that the president acted in a sphere that is constitutionally entrusted to
Congress. Thus, an inquiry into whether or not Congress would endorse the action gets at whether
the same result would have come about eventually had the president not acted, or in the case of
impossibility at that later point, whether Congress would have acted had it the chance. In this way,
the inquiry parallels the preliminary injunction mandate that the movant be able to show a "likeli-
hood of success on the merits."
By contrast, in those rare instances where the president's use of the prerogative power takes
him outside the Constitution altogether, including the powers granted to Congress, the justification
for framing the question from Congress's perspective is understandably lessened. In these situations,
it would seem logical to inquire instead something like, "Was there a substantial likelihood that the
people would endorse the president's action?" Even in such a scenario, though, it would not be
unreasonable to still look to what Congress would have done, since such an inquiry would be (1)
easier to conduct, and (2) in keeping with republican principles since Congress is rightfully consid-
ered an agent of the people. On the latter point, see, for example, James G. Wilson, Justice Diffused:
A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Vews of Five Conservative, Academic
Judges, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 913, 969 (1986) ("Congress is an agent of the people for purposes of
enacting [the law]." (quoting Antonin Scalia, Remarks at Bicentennial Institute on Oversight and
Review of Agency Decisionmaking (Mar. 19, 1976), in 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 569, 694 (1976))),
94. Cf., e.g., Guilbert, 934 F.2d at 5 (taking into account the "potential for irreparable in-
jury").
95. Cf., e.g., id. (taking into account a "balancing of the relevant equities, most importantly,
the hardship to the nonmovant if the [preliminary injunction] issues as contrasted with the hardship
to the movant if interim relief is withheld").
96. Cf, e.g., id. (taking into account the "effect on the public interest of a grant or denial").
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tively appealing in the context of executive action for a couple reasons.
First, because it is rule-like, it provides a relatively clear limit on the types
of action the president can take and expect to have legitimated after the fact.
In this sense, it gives the executive some degree of notice as to where the
outer boundaries of his practical power are.
Second, and principally, our tolerance of extraordinary executive action
is rightly limited to those situations where action is most necessary. The
''status quo disruption" requirement is a good proxy for the type of necessity
with which we should be concerned because it recognizes that the situations
most in need of quick action by the executive will be those in which other-
wise a bad event would occur that would disrupt the normal course of events
before regular action, perhaps by Congress, could be taken. That is to say,
the idea from preliminary injunction analysis is almost directly applicable
here: the president employs an extraordinary measure when he acts, but he
does so legitimately when doing so is necessary to preserve the status quo
until such time as action can be taken through normal channels. Under this
view, the president essentially steps out of the normal boundaries of his
power temporarily when quick action is needed to prevent a bad event from
occurring-and then steps back into those boundaries when the initial emer-
gency has subsided.
Finally, at least theoretically, limiting the president's use of the preroga-
tive power to situations designed to preserve the status quo rather than
effecting positive change makes the clean-up from any executive
overstepping easier to remedy. From a logical standpoint, the ultimate deci-
sionmaker's reversal of the initial action is less disruptive in the case where
the act simply maintained the status quo rather than deviated from it in some
way.97 In the former case, a later contrary decision merely puts an end to
what was, in effect, a stay, while in the latter case, the decision itself
changes the new status quo in an attempt to bring back the status quo ante-
which, in reality, might be difficult or impossible to do. In this sense, the
"disrupt the status quo" threshold is essential to preserve the ability to judge
the president's action effectively.
If the president's action meets the first threshold, we can move on to the
second part of the analysis to determine if the particular action is justifiable.
This part of the analysis is decidedly more flexible than the threshold rule,
as it is a standard consisting of four factors relevant to the president's justifi-
cation for taking extraordinary action. While the "status quo" element of the
initial rule in the executive action context mirrors the rule in preliminary
injunction analysis, the second part obviously requires some modification to
be of use.98 Thus, the factors outlined above99 and discussed briefly below
represent an attempt to borrow the general idea of preliminary injunction
analysis while making it relevant to the new subject matter, all the while
97. See supra note 76.
98. See, e.g., Guilbert, 934 F.2d at 5.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
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maintaining a focus on the framework's ability to legitimate executive ac-
tion.
The first factor, whether there was "a substantial likelihood that Con-
gress would endorse the president's action," focuses on the extent to which
the early action taken by the executive was expected to differ from the deci-
sion that Congress would have taken had that body time to act. This is a
relevant consideration because the president's act will appear more proper if
it results in the same outcome that would have occurred through recourse to
the usual channels; arguably, the result is the same, only the means and tim-
ing of the action are different.'0 Notably, however, even a knowing deviation
from action Congress would have been expected to take is not dispositive of
the question whether the president's action was proper.'O' Instead, in this
framework, it is just one factor to be taken into consideration in deciding the
propriety of the executive action.
The second factor, whether there was "a substantial threat of irreparable
damage or injury if the president had not acted," focuses on the likelihood
and extent of the damage that would have resulted if the president had not
acted. This is an especially relevant consideration, as it hones in on the justi-
fication for the president's action. Obviously, a 90 percent chance of
apocalypse in absence of the president's action makes the act more justifi-
able than a 10 percent chance of only a minor inconvenience. In between
these poles, it is useful to view this factor as a sliding scale along which the
decisionmaker can weigh the probability and degree of severity of the alter-
native result. 1
0 2
The third factor, whether "the balance of harms weigh[ed] in favor of the
president," is related closely to the second. It focuses on a comparison of the
positive benefit the president expected to obtain for the public by acting and
the expected negative effect that taking extraordinary action would have on
the country. Essentially, it attempts to recreate a cost-benefit analysis, taking
into account all externalities. On this last point, for instance, while the pres-
ident might not see encroaching on Congress's power to act03 as being
particularly harmful, at least in comparison to the threat he felt the need to
confront, the effect the president's action had on this balance of power is
nevertheless a relevant consideration when balancing the harms.
Finally, the fourth factor, whether "the president's action [was] taken in
the public interest," focuses on whether the president acted with the public
interest in mind. If adopted as it exists in the preliminary injunction con-
100. See discussion supra note 93.
101. Contra Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
102. The relevant parallel in equity is the adequacy or inadequacy of a damage remedy. There,
the concern is whether the potential harm is of the kind that could not be satisfactorily remedied
after the fact, thus warranting an extraordinary action in the form of an equitable remedy. Here the
concern is whether the potential harm is great enough that it could not be satisfactorily remedied in
absence of the president's extraordinary action.
103. See discussion supra note 93.
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text'- without any modification, this factor would be related too closely to
some of the other factors-particularly the second and third. For instance,
the greater the probability and severity of the negative result the president
acted to avoid, the greater that action would seem to accord with the public
interest. Also, the public interest is certainly taken into consideration as part
of an analysis of the "balance of harms."''0 5 Thus, to adapt this prong of the
preliminary injunction framework to the executive-power context without
making it obsolete, it is necessary to deviate a bit from the objective ap-
proach of the other factors. The public interest factor can easily be made
relevant as its own separate factor by employing it to take into consideration
the primary motivation behind the president's action. And this preservation
technique makes conceptual sense because the president's motivation is it-
self important. As scholars have noted, it is within the public interest to have
the president thinking that he is working in good faith to further the public
interest.'0 If, for example, the president acted to stop oil-well workers from
striking, that might well have averted a "substantial threat" of "irreparable
damage" to the economy and the "balance of harms" could perhaps have
been in favor of action. Nevertheless, if the president's primary motivation
for preventing the strike were to, say, increase third-quarter profits for a par-
ticular oil company rather than prevent economic turmoil, then the fourth
factor could capture this difference in order to weigh against recognizing the
president's action as legitimate.
Certainly, a list of factors is only one part of a standards-based analysis.
Just as important is how much weight is given to the factors and how much
we should demand of the president to meet the factors. This presents a real
problem. Obviously, much of the analysis is in the realm of conjecture. This
is made even more so by the desire to focus these factors primarily on a rea-
sonable ex ante perception of the president when he was acting. 0 7 For
104. See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) (taking into
account the "effect on the public interest of a grant or denial").
105. This could happen in one of two ways. In cases where the president is acting in a sphere
constitutionally entrusted to Congress, the public interest is implicated in an analysis of the "balance
of harms" because the parties to the "dispute" are both agents of the people, and officers (or offices)
in the United States government. And in cases where the president is acting in a sphere not even
constitutionally entrusted to Congress, the public interest arguably is implicated even more directly,
as the adversarial party would then seem most logically to be the people directly. See generally
supra note 93.
106. Cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 865,
866 (2007) ("Where the executive is indeed ill motivated ... constraining his discretion ... may be
sensible. But ... [wihere the executive is in fact a faithful agent, using his increased discretion to
promote the public good ... then constraints on executive discretion are all cost and no benefit.").
See generally id. at 865-913 (discussing the importance of the powerful modem executive having
benign motivations, and arguing for various ways the president could credibly signal these motiva-
tions).
107. Cf Jeremy David Bailey, Executive Prerogative and the "Good Officer" in Thomas
Jefferson's Letter to John B. Colvin, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 732, 738 (2004) ("[Wlith the bene-
fit of hindsight, the people may know the circumstances better than the executive did at the time.").
Hindsight balancing can lead to risk aversion, disincentivizing the executive from taking necessary
action. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 90-95 ("The Church and Pike investigations of the 1970s
and the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s taught the intelligence community to worry about what a
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example, how is the decisionmaker deciding after the fact to know what the
president could have imagined would have resulted had he not acted? This
difficulty supports a flexible approach to the factors when analyzing a presi-
dent's action.10 8 After all, these emergency situations almost by definition
often force the president to act on limited information without the benefit of
a prolonged consideration of his options.
III. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
Part III demonstrates how this equitable framework can function in the
context of executive power by examining three instances in which the presi-
dent seemingly stepped outside his usual bounds of power, and applying the
modified preliminary injunction framework to each to test for practical le-
gitimacy. This Part seeks to explore the contours of the test proposed in Part
II, and to clarify its application to the sorts of executive-power disputes that
might arise in the future. In particular, this Part focuses on Jefferson's 1803
purchase of the Louisiana Territory, Lincoln's 1861 limited suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, and Truman's 1952 seizure of the nation's steel
mills. Jefferson's case provides an especially apt example of how the initial
threshold rule operates, while Lincoln's and Truman's cases show the intri-
cacies of the subsequent standards-based analysis. Ultimately, only
Lincoln's action is practically legitimate.
A. Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase
Just fourteen years after the ratification of the Constitution, Jefferson
was presented with the option to expand the country's borders westward by
purchasing territory "equal in size to the entire United States of that day. ' °9
What began as authorized negotiations with France and Spain to purchase
the city of New Orleans proper and territory in Florida" turned surprisingly
into an invitation to purchase France's entire tract of land west of the Mis-
sissippi."' While not authorized by Congress to do so,"' Jefferson made
1996 Council on Foreign Relations study decried as 'retroactive discipline'-the idea that no matter
how much political and legal support an intelligence operative gets before engaging in aggressive
actions, he will be punished after the fact by a different set of rules created in a different political
environment.").
108. Cf supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
109. EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE 1803-1812, at 1-2 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1920).
110. JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC 103 (2002) (noting that Jefferson authorized
Madison to purchase New Orleans and the two Floridas).
111. See BROWN, supra note 109, at 8-11; WILSON, supra note 110, at 103.
112. Even under the most charitable reading of the Constitution-viewing completion of the
purchase as the formation of a treaty-it would seem that that document does not give the president
the power to make such a decision unilaterally, without the "Advice and Consent of the Senate." See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Indeed, Jefferson himself was skeptical of his constitutional power to
acquire new territories, and expressed the belief that doing so was more a matter of expediency. See
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Jan. 1803), in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON at 3 n. 1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905); see also John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88
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what was in essence a split-second decision to accept the French offer, pay-
ing the sum of 60 million francs plus the cancellation of 20 million francs of
French debt in return for the land." 3
Running this action through the modified preliminary injunction frame-
work, we find that it fails the test for practical legitimacy. Under the
framework, we first confront the threshold status quo rule, in which we ask
whether "the executive action in question [was] designed to prevent an event
from occurring that would disrupt the status quo."'" 4 And it is here that we
find serious complications for any claim Jefferson might make for the prac-
tical legitimacy of his actions. To keep the status quo rule as relevant as it is
in the preliminary injunction context, it is necessary to take the rule at its
plain meaning." 5 Doing so here means focusing on whether there was an
antecedent situation that the president sought to protect by taking action.
There was not. The United States had no rightful claims to the Louisiana
territory prior to Jefferson's purchase," 6 so his action in purchasing that land
and thereby gaining a rightful claim to it was not an act of status quo preser-
vation. Rather, the act brought about an affirmative change in the status quo
by adding new territory.
One possible counterargument is that Jefferson could be seen to have
preserved the status quo if we recognize France's offer itself as the status
quo. Under this theory, for instance, a refusal to accept the offer might have
meant the opportunity to purchase would be lost, thus disrupting the status
quo, and so an acceptance was necessary to prevent this harmful event from
occurring. But on closer inspection, this argument is not convincing; this
ability to manipulate the definition of the status quo would swallow the rule.
If it were the case that a mere offer for something created expectations that
could constitute the status quo, nearly any executive action could fit the
threshold rule." 7 Furthermore, even if France's offer constituted the status
quo, Jefferson's acceptance did not preserve this status quo. After all, the
offer, as such, went off the table the moment Jefferson accepted it-and thus
B.U. L. REV. 421, 435-43 (2008) (describing Jefferson's changing conceptions of executive power
in relation to the Louisiana Purchase).
113. Roger K. Ward, The Louisiana Purchase, 50 LA. B. J. 331, 334 (2003). This was equal to
roughly $15 million. Id. In contrast, the House had appropriated $2 million for the purchase of the
city of New Orleans and Florida. 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 370-74 (1802-03). For a quick but thorough
description of the facts surrounding the Louisiana Purchase, see RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MIS-
FORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN": A NEW HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 61-64 (1991).
114. See supra text accompanying note 92.
115. See generally Barbara Child, What Does "Plain Meaning" Mean These Days?, 3
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 3 (1992) ("The meaning of terms ... ought to be determined ... on
the basis of which meaning is []most in accord with context and ordinary usage ...." (quoting
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
116. The United States did, however, enjoy a "right of deposit" in the city of New Orleans,
which it gained from Spain in the Treaty of San Lorenzo of 1796. John Duncan, Uti Possidetis: Is
Possession Really Nine-Tenths of the Law?, 38 McGEORGE L. Rv. 513,516 (2007).
117. For instance, if the president were offered a return of American hostages in exchange for
nuclear weapons, he could not normally argue that accepting this would be an act designed to pre-
vent a change in the status quo. If, however, the offer of the exchange were itself the status quo, then
accepting it might be the only way to prevent a change for the worse.
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if the status quo were the ability to purchase the land, then that affirmatively
changed as a result of Jefferson's action.
Another, and better, possible counterargument is that Jefferson preserved
the status quo by purchasing the land from France if the status quo were
seen as the United States enjoying a peaceable Western border. This argu-
ment would focus on the fact that the Louisiana Territory was, since 1762, a
Spanish possession and only officially came into France's possession after
the Treaty of San Ildefonso on November 30, 1803.8 As Jefferson stated in
his second annual message to Congress on December 15, 1802, "The ces-
sion of the Spanish Province of Louisiana to France, which took place in the
course of the late war, will if carried into effect, make a change in the aspect
of our foreign relations ... * "9 At the time of France and Spain's negotia-
tions about transferring the territory, one historian notes there was
"widespread alarm" at the prospect of "a stronger power [coming] into con-
tact with the United States."'120 Indeed, along with a desire to expand the
nation's territory, it was in part this fear that prompted Congress to authorize
negotiations with France to purchase the city of New Orleans and the Flor-
ida territories. 121
At the same time, a number of considerations recommend against view-
ing Jefferson's subsequent action to purchase the entire Louisiana Territory
from France as a justifiable act in preservation of this "peaceable border"
status quo. For one, just as the case with viewing Napoleon's offer as the
status quo, doing so here would mean that Jefferson's action did not pre-
serve it. Rather, by purchasing the land, Jefferson changed what might have
arguably been a border with a relatively weak military power into no border
at all. Second, Jefferson later as much as admitted that, rather than being
driven by a desire to preserve a relatively peaceful border, the primary moti-
vation for the purchase was a desire to expand the country's boundaries.
And this was not merely an abstract desire to bring about Western expansion
for expansion's sake;' 23 the action had direct, practical consequences. To
take just one, purchasing the land for the United States meant gaining an
118. Roger K. Ward, Comment, The French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Tradition:
A Requiem, 57 LA. L. REv. 1283, 1289 (1997). The treaty was negotiated between the countries in
secret, with the official turnover taking place on November 30. Id.
119. BROWN, supra note 109, at 3 (quoting JAMES D. RICHARDSON, I A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 343 (1899)).
120. Id.
121. Seeid. at 3-11.
122. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 107, at 735-36; WILSON, supra note 110, at 103.
123. What would later come to be known in the Jacksonian era as the United States's "mani-
fest destiny." See generally Robert W. Johannsen, The Meaning of Manifest Destiny, in MANIFEST
DESTINY AND EMPIRE 7 (Robert W. Johannsen et al. eds., 1997); Thomas R. Hietala, "This Splendid
Juggernaut": Westward a Nation and Its People, in MANIFEST DESTINY AND EMPIRE, supra, at 48.
In the era of the Louisiana Purchase, John Quincy Adams's theory of continentalism seems a more
apt fit-though even this theory was predicated on a perception of American power not yet prevalent





"indisputable right to free navigation of the Mississippi, an important
trade route, which the United States did not enjoy when Spain controlled the
territory.
Finally, it is also difficult to conceive of a border with a relatively
nonaggressive foreign country as a status quo subject to the president's
preservation, since it depends on the actions of the foreign power with
which we share the border. After all, while the practical reality was that
Spain was probably no longer in a position to be militarily aggressive, this
was not an "event" that the United States had any legitimate expectation it
alone could preserve. Rather, the relatively peaceable nature of that relation-
ship depended on the actions of a foreign power, in this case, Spain; and one
need look no further than the contemporary rise of Napoleon in France to
see how subject to change the essential ingredients of that relationship
125
was.
While it seems as if Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory vio-
lates the threshold status quo rule, and thus likely fails to satisfy the
framework,126 this does not mean that the president as a merely practical
matter cannot act. Despite his own (mostly constitutional) qualms with it,17
Jefferson apparently felt comfortable acting anyway.128 What this does mean,
however-in addition to other, more concrete concerns about the constitu-
tionality of his actions 129-is that his action did not carry with it the
presumption of practical legitimacy that fulfilling the modified preliminary
injunction framework can provide. As a matter of pure power, unless some-
one or something stands in his way, the president can take any action within
his control. It is when his action is later called into question, then, that the
denial of practical legitimacy can have its greatest effect. Essentially, he is
reduced to asking the people for their implicit endorsement of his action to
bring about an affirmative change in the status quo,3° in this case the
124. BROWN, supra note 109, at 11.
125. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (describing the distrust Jefferson and many others in the U.S. gov-
ernment had of Napoleon).
126. To be sure, in preliminary injunction cases, many courts applying the bifurcated ap-
proach do not technically stop the inquiry with a negative determination of the threshold status quo
question. See, e.g., SCFC 1LC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1991). Instead, they
often ratchet up the level with which the party must then satisfy the subsequent factors, in effect
putting a thumb on the scale in favor of not granting the injunction. See, e.g., id. See generally Lee,
supra note 71, at 115-21. The example of Jefferson and the Louisiana purchase, however, is meant
to focus on the threshold question, triggering with it a much higher standard than the rest of the
framework applies, so that is where the discussion ends.
127. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 107, at 735.
128. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 110, at 103 ("Jefferson's quick confirmation of Monroe's
bold decision revealed that his enduring desire to expand the country invariably prevailed over some
of his most cherished constitutional and his republicanism [sic] beliefs."); Bailey, supra note 107, at
736.
129. Again, this Note is not especially concerned with the question of constitutionality. Ra-
ther, the purpose is merely to focus on practical arguments in hopes of determining whether the
executive action was "practically legitimate," which does not necessarily mean it was constitutional:
that is a separate analysis.
130. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 107, at 736.
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expansion of the country's borders. And in so doing, he subjects himself to
public scrutiny, with its infamous hindsight bias, 3' along with all the other
complications that having to do so entails.
B. Lincoln and Habeas Corpus'32
On April 12, 1861, confederate troops in South Carolina, which had re-
cently seceded from the United States, fired upon Union soldiers stationed
at Fort Sumter.33 Soon after, recognizing that war with the South was at
hand, Lincoln called up volunteer troop regiments in the Northeast to come
to the D.C. area to reinforce what had become the de facto border against
confederate attack.3 4 These regiments enjoyed safe passage along the train
route though most of the area south of Philadelphia until they came to Bal-
timore.' Maryland was a slave state that had not seceded, though in 1861 it
was certainly far from clear that it would not do So. 36 Baltimore, in particu-
lar, contained its fair share of secessionists and others understandably
reluctant to be at the center of a war between the North and South.3 7 When
the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment entered the city, a riot among Baltimore
residents broke OUt. 38 In the ensuing battle, a number of soldiers and civil-
ians were killed. 39 After the riot had subsided, the Baltimore mayor and
Maryland governor decided they were not going to take any more chances,
and announced that their territory would henceforth be closed to troop
movements. 40 Having recruited his own proconfederate militia, Lieutenant
John Merryman drove back a regiment of Union troops and burned a bridge
to prevent their reentry into Baltimore.
14
131. Cf, e.g., id. at 738 ("[W]ith the benefit of hindsight, the people may know the circum-
stances better than the executive did at the time.").
132. N.B. This consideration is limited to the facts surrounding Ex parte Merryman, 17 F
Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487), not subsequent actions taken by Lincoln.
133. Michael Les Benedict, "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions": Lincoln, the
Powers of the Commander in Chief and the Constitution, 29 CARDOzO L. REV. 927, 931 (2008).
134. Clay Bland, Jr., A Constitutional Limitation: The Controversy Surrounding The Military
Commissions Act of 2006 and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 53 Loy. L. REV. 497, 509-10 (2007).
135. Id. at 510.
136. GEORGE WILLIAM BROWN, BALTIMORE AND THE NINETEENTH OF APRIL 1861 - A
STUDY OF THE WAR 33-34 (2001 ed. 2001) (1887).
137. See Les Benedict, supra note 133, at 931-37.
138. BROWN, supra note 136, 42-54.
139. Id.
140. See Letter from Baltimore Mayor George William Brown to President Lincoln (Apr. 19,
1861), in BROWN, supra note 136, at 57 ("[lIt is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible
for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore unless they fight their way at every step."). See gener-
ally BROWN at 56-57.
141. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 278 (1994); see also Frank J. Williams et al., Still a Frightening Un-
known: Achieving a Constitutional Balance Between Civil Liberties and National Security During
the War on Terror, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 675, 688 (2007).
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Trying to gauge an effective response, Lincoln discussed with his cabi-
net the possibility of suspending the writ of habeas corpus. 142 Eventually, on
April 27, 1861, Lincoln notified Winfield Scott that he had suspended the
writ in the "vicinity of the military line," and authorized General Scott to
round up insurgents.14 1 Merryman was one of those subsequently captured
and held at Fort McHenry without formal charges lodged against him. 44 He
protested his indefinite imprisonment, and filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the circuit court, which fell under the purview of Chief Justice Taney.1
4 5
Taney eventually came down with a decision in Ex parte Merryman,146 in
which he delivered a stinging rebuke to the president, declaring Lincoln's
• • 141
act in suspending the writ unconstitutional.
Applying the modified preliminary injunction framework, Lincoln's
suspension of the writ seems to better satisfy the initial threshold rule than
Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory. In particular, it seems logical
to treat Lincoln's act as one "designed to prevent an event from occurring
that would disrupt the status quo.' 48 In Lincoln's best case, the event would
be insurrection in the state of Maryland, and the status quo would be that
Maryland was still at that time part of the Union. Even if we were more par-
ticular and labeled the event as something such as "the ability to transport
Union troops to the border," Lincoln's action would pass. To be sure, in this
scenario, there had already been a disruption in the status quo (Maryland
had already interfered with the ability of Union troops to pass through its
' 49
territory), and so strictly speaking Lincoln's act would not be to preserve
the status quo as it existed at the precise time he acted.
But there is no need to be this rigid when it comes to the rule. After all,
this rule is borrowed from the doctrine dealing with preliminary injunctions,
and in those cases the party seeking the injunction has often already suffered
some disruption of the status quo. 50 In that sense, the party is asking the
142. Les Benedict, supra note 133, at 935.
143. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1227,
1286 (2008).
144. Id. at 1287.
145. Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Constitution and Civil Liberties Under Lincoln, in OUR LIN-
COLN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LINCOLN AND His WORLD 37, 38 (Eric Foner ed., 2008).
146. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
147. Id. at 148. For a quick but thorough description of the facts leading up to Merryman, see
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 284-89 (1988) [hereinafter
MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY]. For a more detailed look at Lincoln's Civil War policies, see JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF (2008) [hereinafter
MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR].
148. See supra text accompanying note 92.
149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
150. Take, for example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C.
1952), aff'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the plaintiffs, owners of steel companies seized by the
government, asked the court to enjoin the government from taking control of their steel mills. At the
time of this argument, the government had already taken steps to take control of the steel mills, and
the owners had complied. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583-84 (1952).
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court to preserve the status quo by in effect recognizing and preserving the
status quo that existed before the opponent acted to disrupt it. In essence,
this is exactly what Lincoln did here. If the "event" were the ability to use
Maryland's territory for Union troop deployment, then the status quo could
well be Maryland's consistent implied authorization for the president to do
so. Maryland's status as a nonbelligerent state created reasonable and le-
gitimate expectations' that the president could send troops through in times
of war. Its later illegitimate action in effectively denying the president the
ability to do so does not, then, destroy the notion of the status quo ante of
the president being able to do so, which he could therefore rightfully take
action to preserve. Lincoln's limited suspension of the writ thus seems to
pass the threshold rule rather easily.
Following the framework, we next examine whether there was "a sub-
stantial likelihood that Congress would [have endorsed] the president's
action."' 52 This is in many ways the most difficult factor because it is prem-
ised on discerning the intent of a body with regard to an action it did not
take and, indeed, was not asked to take. In some sense, when a president
acts without congressional approval, it seems reasonable to presume that
Congress would not have approved of the action. After all, one might won-
der, if he thought Congress would approve it, then why did the president not
simply go to Congress and get authorization? Weighing against the logic of
this presumption, however, is the recognition that if the president is forced
to act quickly, he might simply lack the time to go to Congress and get ex-
press authorization. This is particularly relevant in Lincoln's case. Lincoln
was, after all, confronted with the prospect of a unique and unprecedented
civil war. Add to this context a state that is not too partial to the Union
cause, 1 yet in an especially strategic geographic location, '54 telling the
president that he can no longer expect to send Union troops through its terri-
tory, and it seems the case for an emergency is quite strong. In this scenario,
it is probably reasonable" 5' to presume that Congress would endorse the
president taking action, and while it might be questionable whether this en-
151. Cf Nelson v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 512 F.3d. 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) (dis-
cussing reasonable, legitimate expectations in a different constitutional context); United States v.
Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (same).
152. See supra text accompanying note 93.
153. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Execu-
tive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 89-90 (1993) ("Secessionist activity was
rampant in ... Maryland, which had voted for Kentucky's Breckenridge in the presidential election
and had a large secessionist minority.").
154. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. Ross, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MIL-
LER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 66 (2003) ("Confederate partisans like
Merryman were common in the border states, but their presence in Maryland-a state that enclosed
Washington on three sides-was particularly troubling. If Maryland secessionists could not be sub-
dued, the capital could be cut off from the Union."); Mark D. Friedman, Say "'Cheese." Uncle Sam
Wants Your Photograph and Fingerprints or You Are Out of Here. Does America Have a Peace Time
Constitution in Danger of Being Lost?, 30 NOVA L. REv. 223, 228 (2006) (noting Maryland's "stra-
tegic importance to Washington D.C. in the war effort").
155. Though probably not "substantially likely." See supra text accompanying note 93.
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dorsement would extend to an action as drastic as Lincoln's suspension of
the writ, it is not beyond reason that it would do so.156
Second, we ask whether there was "a substantial threat of irreparable
damage or injury if the president had not acted."'57 This seems to be a good
factor for Lincoln. Again the context is important; examining this matter
from the perspective of the president, it seems that the inability to send
troops through Maryland's territory could have disastrous consequences for
the impending war effort." 8 A counterargument might be that, if this were
the only harm, Lincoln could have averted it by simply ferrying troops to the
border through the Chesapeake Bay, which, indeed, Lincoln did as an im-
mediate consequence of the Baltimore riots.'5 9 But this counterargument is
ultimately unpersuasive. For instance, an inability to send troops through
Maryland by ground, even when sending troops by water was an option,
could very well have been seen by the president as hindering the war effort
to a substantial degree.'6° It would have been difficult for anyone to predict
the extent of the civil war when Lincoln acted in 1861, and so one could
easily have concluded that the restrictions on how troops could be brought
to the border with the South could bring about significant, if currently un-
knowable, damage to the Union cause.
One might also argue that Lincoln might well have been justified in act-
ing, but that he did not need to take as drastic an action as suspending the
writ. In this sense, the second factor, with its focus on "irreparable damage,"
can be seen to incorporate something like a mitigation requirement that
would require the president to attempt to keep potential damages to a mini-161
mum. Critics might argue that Lincoln could have taken action quelling
the riot in Baltimore, and restoring order so as to provide safe movement of
Union troops without having to resort to suspending the writ. It is, however,
unclear just what Lincoln could have done. Certainly, he could have at-
tempted to send in more troops to squelch the rebellion, though this would
have probably stoked angry local sentiment even further-and even run the
risk that Maryland would join its sister state, Virginia, in seceding. 62 In-
stead, Lincoln took a measure better aimed at reinforcing Union control in
156. Indeed, Congress ultimately ratified Lincoln's action after the fact, though much later,
and suspended the writ in 1863. See Les Benedict, supra note 133, at 936 n.50 (citing Habeas Cor-
pus Act of 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863)).
157. See supra text accompanying note 94.
158. See supra note 154.
159. Patrick S. Poole, An Examination of Ex Parte Merryman (1994), available at http://mb-
faculty.mosesbrown.org/dmacleod/expartemenyman.html.
160. Again, the strategic importance of Maryland is notable. See supra note 154. If it fell to
the confederacy, the Union would likely have had to abandon the capital.
161. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing
the need for the proponent to mitigate damages in the context of a preliminary injunction); see also
YORK ET AL., supra note 71, at 226 (discussing the common "obligation to mitigate damages").
162. See BROWN, supra note 136, at 33.
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the state quietly. 63 Given again the extraordinary context of an outbreak of
civil war, it makes sense to provide the president with some degree of flexi-
bility in choosing the manner of his response, so long as that response is
itself justifiable.' 64
Third, we ask whether "the balance of harms weighed in favor of the
president."'' 65 In some ways, this seems to be a harder standard for Lincoln to
satisfy, mostly because of the potential problem his action creates for the
balance of power between the president and Congress. We should note yet
again, however, that on Lincoln's side in this balancing equation is the fact
that he was confronted with the prospect of a civil war, which doubtless
warranted some degree of extraordinary action. On the other side is Con-
gress's interest in retaining its de facto control over the decision as to
whether and when to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.166
It would not be altogether unreasonable to find that, even on the specific
separation of powers question, the balance weighs in favor of the president.
For instance, Lincoln claimed that he had the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, and the ability to delegate this power to his commanders in
the field.167 Lincoln's belief that he had the power to do so was not without
reasonable grounding. Moreover, there was nothing explicit that said the
president did not have this power. Lincoln's attorney general, Edward Bates,
persuaded Lincoln that "the Constitution was vague as to which branch
should exercise the power to suspend, and, as the head of a coordinate and
co-equal branch, the President had the power to interpret the Constitu-
tion. ' Lincoln himself pointed to the fact that the Constitution explicitly
authorized suspension in cases of rebellion, and argued that "it cannot be
believed the framers of the instrument intended that, in every case, the dan-
163. After all, he did not give any notice that he had suspended the writ in the vicinity of the
military line in Maryland. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No.
9487).
164. See supra text accompanying note 108.
165. See supra text accompanying note 95.
166. Cf., e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148 ("I had supposed it to be one of those
points of constitutional law upon which there was no difference of opinion, and that it was admitted
on all hands, that the privilege of the writ could not be suspended, except by act of congress."). Of
course, Congress has its own constraints when it comes to suspending the writ. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."). The insurrectionist rebellion in Mary-
land would seem to fit quite snugly in that clause, however.
167. E.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Introduction, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1147, 1155 n.48 (2008)
("Lincoln authorized Union officers to suspend the writ .... He did so with an eye toward Balti-
more, which ... was known to be a 'hotbed of secessionist activity.' ") (citing Paulsen, supra note
141).
168. Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Argu-
ments Surrounding Ex parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 11, 21 (2004); see also Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 n.3 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Since the
Constitution implies that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in certain circumstances but
does not say by whom, President Lincoln asserted and maintained it as an executive function in the
face of judicial challenge and doubt."). Justice Jackson used Lincoln's 1861 suspension of the Great
Writ as an example of how "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." Id. at 637.
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ger should run its course, until Congress could be called together; the very
assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by
the rebellion."' 69 To be sure, Justice Marshall seemed to imply in dictum in
Ex parte Bollman 7 that the suspension of the writ was the providence of the
legislature, not the executive-an assumption on which Taney also relied.'
7
'
And a structural analysis of the Constitution would seem to put the suspen-
sion power in Congress's domain.' But the Suspension Clause's location in
Article I did not necessarily mean that the president did not also have this
power through implication in Article 11.173 Furthermore, even if not techni-
cally allowed, Lincoln could probably quite reasonably have believed that,
given the context of a civil war, some degree of flexibility in dealing with an
emergency brought with it a right for him to suspend the writ when he
'74deemed it absolutely imperative to do so.
Of course, Congress's separation of powers interest is not the only inter-
est that must be weighed against the president's. Other interested parties
would certainly include Merryman and all the others held without formal
charges as a result of Lincoln's suspension. Merryman might well have
claimed that, while Lincoln had a number of legitimate harms to consider on
his side, Merryman's civil liberty interests outweighed these interests, so the
balance of harms should be held to be in Merryman's favor. Cutting against
this, however, is that Merryman's was not an absolute claim to this particu-
lar civil liberty. For instance, if Congress had suspended the writ under
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 (as it later did in 186317), Merryman would
have had nothing to complain about. It seems odd to accord an especially
weighty interest-one strong enough to trump the civil war emergency on
Lincoln's side-to a civil liberties dispute that boils down to a problem
169. Abraham Lincoln, Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of
Congress at the Commencement of the First Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress (July 5, 1861),
in U.S. SENATE, 37TH CONG., JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 13 (1st Sess. 1861). See generally HORACE
BINNEY, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, SECOND
PART (Phila., C. Sherman & Son 1862), cited in Jackson, supra note 168, at 27 n. I11.
170. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) ("If at any time the public safety should require the
suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature
to say so.").
171. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148.
172. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."); Ex
parte Merryman, 17 F Cas. at 148-50.
173. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 147, at 288; Jackson, supra note 168, at
49-52; Craig S. Lerner, Saving the Constitution: Lincoln, Secession, and the Price of Union, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1263, 1292-95 (2004) (reviewing DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION
(2003)); Paulsen, supra note 153, at 91-99 (1993).
174. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 147, at 288 ("Several prominent consti-
tutional lawyers [argued that] ... suspension was an emergency power to be exercised in case of
rebellion [and] the president was the only person who could act quickly enough in an emergency,
especially when Congress was not in session."); Jackson, supra note 168, at 49.
175. See Les Benedict, supra note 133, at 935-41 (citing Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81,
12 Stat. 755 (1863)).
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merely with the fact that the president suspended the writ, and not Con-
176
gress.
Fourth, we ask whether "the president's action [was] taken in the public
interest." '77 Here, the point that stands out above all the others is the very
weighty public interest in the successful prosecution of a civil war, which
would seem to accord Lincoln significant leeway. Again, the proper mode of
analysis is from the president's perspective, and looking at it from Lincoln's
point of view, it would seem that a limited suspension of the writ "in the
vicinity of the military line" was designed to further the legitimate public
interest in a successful Union war effort, and to curb the outbreak of seces-
sionist rebellion in Union territory. There is a potential problem, however. If
Lincoln's actions were motivated merely to corral partisan opponents and
silence his critics, 7 8 then this would certainly cut against recognizing Lin-
coln's actions as practically legitimate. Absent this as a primary motivating
factor, however, that partisan opponents were some of those rounded up fol-
lowing Lincoln's suspension of the writ would seem to get at another
question-whether the president acted improperly in those specific in-
stances-rather than the practical legitimacy of his initial decision to
suspend the writ.
179
When applying the second prong of the analysis it is necessary to step
back a bit and look at all the factors in light of the first part of the second
prong: "[D]oes a consideration of [these] relevant factors surrounding the
decision to act weigh in favor of the president taking such action?"'80 Apply-
ing something akin to the "alternative test" in preliminary injunction
analysis, it would appear that the factors, taken as a whole, favor finding
Lincoln's act to suspend the writ as practically legitimate. To be sure, there
are lingering issues within most factors, but it seems the reasonable poten-
tial that Congress would endorse the president's actions, the great potential
for irreparable damage to the war effort had Lincoln not acted, the debatable
separation of powers issue, and the public interest in protecting the Union
cut across all the factors and make a finding for the president quite plausible
under the circumstances.
176. Of course, as a matter of constitutional law, the distinction means a great deal. Here,
however, we are only concerned with the harm to Merryman and others rounded up as a result of
Lincoln's suspension-and that harm would have been the same had it been Congress that sus-
pended the writ. But cf infra text accompanying notes 238-239.
177. See supra text accompanying note 96.
178. See, e.g., David Williams, Civil Liberties, U.S.A., in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CIVIL WAR 442, 443 (David S. Heidler & Jeanne T. Heidler eds., 2002) ("In trying to suppress dis-
sent, Lincoln and other Republicans were often motivated more by politics than by patriotism. They
tended to paint their opponents with a broad brush of treason, and people sometimes suffered arrest
and worse for no other crime than being a Democrat."). See generally Poole, supra note 159.
179. See supra Section 11.B (discussing "primary motivation" in context of the fourth factor).
180. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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C. Truman and the Steel Mills
By December 1951, the collective bargaining agreements that most
American steel mills had with the United Steelworkers of America Union
were set to expire and no new contract had been negotiated.'"' On December
22, 1951, the government intervened in the failed negotiations, with Presi-
dent Truman referring the matter to the Wage Stabilization Board (WSB),
which was to issue recommendations to the parties.'82 Both management and
the union consented to go before the WSB.183 After a series of private and
public hearings, the WSB issued its nonbinding report on March 20, 1952.'
84
In it, the WSB recommended a series of wage concessions."8 Given the ex-
tent to which the report met its demands, the union promptly accepted the
WSB's recommendations while the management refused to sign on, citing
an increased cost of production that it could not offset with higher prices
due to the government's price stabilization policies. s6 Further attempts at
mediation between the two sides proved fruitless, and on April 4, 1952, the
union announced that its workers would strike effective 12:01 AM, April
9.187
On the evening of April 8, Truman issued Executive Order 10340, in
which he authorized the Secretary of Commerce to "take possession of all or
such of the plants, facilities, and other property" of eighty steel manufactur-
ers listed in the order. s8 This action, the Executive Order stated, was
necessary to ensure a "continuing and uninterrupted supply of steel,' s9 "an
indispensable component"' 9 of our weaponry used in the Korean War. It
added, a "work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our na-
tional defense."' 9' The management complied with the terms of the order but
also brought suit seeking a preliminary injunction in federal district court.19 2
The district court judge ultimately declared the president's actions illegal
181. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
182. Brief for Plaintiff Companies, Petitioners in No. 744 and Respondents in No. 745 at 5,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Nos. 744, 745) [hereinafter Brief
for Plaintiff Companies].
183. Brief for the United Steelworkers of America, CIO, as Amicus Curiae at 11, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Nos. 744, 745) [hereinafter Brief for the Union].
184. Id.
185. Id.; Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 7.
186. See Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 7-8 ("The recommendations of the
Board were not acceptable to the plaintiffs .... They would impose staggering increases in costs
upon the plaintiffs which they could not absorb without risk to the financial stability of their busi-
nesses."); Brief for the Union, supra note 183, at 11.
187. Brief for the Union, supra note 183, at 11.
188. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3141 (Apr. 10, 1952).
189. Id. at 3139.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 3141.
192. Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 9-10.
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and ordered the mills to be returned to the management.' 93 Following this
decision, the union again issued a strike call, and the government requested
a stay.194 The district court denied the stay, but the Court of Appeals-by a
five-to-four margin-granted it, and the steel mills appealed to the Supreme
Court.9 5 The Court, in a series of opinions, ultimately decided against the
constitutionality of Truman's action.' 96
To determine whether Truman's action-however unconstitutional-was
practically legitimate, we first examine whether Truman's action was "de-
signed to prevent an event from occurring that would disrupt the status
quo."' 97 It seems fairly obvious that Truman's April 8 executive order author-
izing seizure of the steel mills passes this threshold rule. The event was a
work stoppage at the steel mills, which, in absence of any executive action
to prevent it, was set to take place in a mere matter of hours. Also, the status
quo in question was fully operational steel mills, producing steel, a process
that requires the workers that were set to strike. It is difficult to see how
Truman's action would not meet this threshold test.
The second-prong analysis is not nearly as friendly to Truman, however.
Following the framework, we first look to whether there was a "substantial
likelihood that Congress would endorse the president's action.!" This does
not seem to be a particularly good factor for President Truman. Importantly,
the executive branch surely knew that the matter of work stoppages-even
under emergency conditions-was an area in which Congress had made its
views well known, and relatively recently at that. 99 The Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947200 (hereafter referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act) set out
a labyrinthine procedure for the president to invoke when "a threatened or
actual strike or lockout, affecting an entire industry or a substantial part [of
it] ... [would] imperil the national health or safety.' 20' This included a series
of injunctions followed by negotiations conducted by the Federal Mediation
• 202
and Conciliation Service. If the parties had still not come to an agreement
by the time the series of injunctions had run out, the president was to submit
193. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D.D.C. 1952).
194. Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 13 ("Immediately upon the announce-
ment of Judge Pine's decision, the Union issued a strike call and its members started to leave the
mills.").
195. Id.
196. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
197. See supra text accompanying note 92.
198. See supra text accompanying note 93.
199. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Congress has not left sei-
zure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with
this seizure."). Of course, for his part, Truman seemed to think that Congress's views on the matter
were irrelevant. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 896-901 (1992) ("From his reading of history,
Truman was convinced his action fell within his powers as President and Commander in Chief.").
200. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 120-101, 61 Stat.
136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (2006)).
201. Id. § 176, quoted in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 656 (Burton, J., concurring).
202. Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 19.
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a report to Congress for that body to take further action. 23 Furthermore,
Congress rejected an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act that would have
204permitted government seizures in cases of emergency.
In response, the president might argue that this does not mean that Con-
gress would not have endorsed his seizure in this particular case-but it
would seem to be a difficult argument to make absent specific indications by
Congress.2' He might, for instance, point out that the language in the Taft-
. 206
Hartley Act made clear that its procedures were optional, not mandatory,
and thus that might have been Congress's way of showing that it might not
think those procedures the proper ones in all circumstances. Alternatively,
he might point to the lack of an effective emergency procedure under the
Tart-Hartley Act, arguing that, even though Congress rejected an explicit
endorsement of seizures, it could have left it as a permissible alternative
when the time for temporary injunctions and further bouts of mediation
came to an end. Weighing against these arguments, however, is that, in the
absence of anything explicitly contrary from Congress, the only thing be-
yond mere conjecture that a decisionmaker could go on in an attempt to
discern whether Congress would have endorsed the decision is the Taft-
Hartley Act. And that act seems stacked against Truman's position.
Second, we look to whether there was "a substantial threat of irreparable
damage or injury if the president had not acted."2 0 This factor seems to be a
mixed bag for the president, but it probably hurts more than helps his case.
On the surface, it certainly seems more than plausible to think that there
would be a substantial threat of damage if he did not act to prevent the
strike. The government's brief in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is
peppered with colorful statements about what it thought would have resulted
in the event of a strike, from "grave and incalculable harm, 20 9 to "pressing
emergency,''210 "critical emergency," '' and "catastrophic [loss]" 2 2-and
203. Id. at 20.
204. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 ("When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in
1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in
cases of emergency. Apparently it was thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory
arbitration, would interfere with the process of collective bargaining.") (citation omitted).
205. Especially considering that the burden in this factor is clearly on the president: there
must have been a "substantial likelihood that Congress would endorse the president's action." See
supra text accompanying note 93 (emphasis added).
206. See Brief for the Union, supra note 183, at 6.
207. See id. at 4-6. But see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 656 & n.2 (Burton, J., concurring).
208. See supra text accompanying note 94.
209. Brief for Petitioner at 90, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(No. 745), reprinted in HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE 798 (1952).





there is no reason to doubt that the potential damage would likely have been
substantial.2 3
At the same time, as we saw above in the analysis of Lincoln's suspen-
sion of the writ,'14 it is appropriate when considering whether the injury was
"irreparable" to ask if the president could have taken other actions that
might have mitigated damages. In Truman's case, it seems there were a
number of reasonable alternative actions that Truman could have taken that
might have prevented the situation from becoming an emergency requiring
seizure of the mills. First, he could have employed the procedures in the
Taft-Hartley Act described above.1 5 Instead, Truman chose to create an ad
hoc procedure for the matter and authorized the WSB to make recommenda-
• 216
tions. Though it is probably unfair to charge this specific knowledge to
Truman acting ex ante, one problem with this strategy was that, as the gov-
ernment itself later admitted, "the fact that the Wage Stabilization Board had
recommended substantial changes ... made it practically certain that the
union would never enter into an agreement calling for no change. 2 7 Thus,
stepping in with the WSB right away, instead of employing Taft-Hartley's
"cooling off' period might very well have made an agreement between the
two sides less likely.
218
Another argument involving Taft-Hartley concerns the fact that, even at
a late stage in the game post-WSB, Truman could have invoked the eighty-
day cooling off period to prevent the strike and avert the emergency.2 9 Thus,
the argument goes, Truman did not need to resort to as drastic a measure as
seizing the steel mills on April 8 to avoid a strike on April 9; he could have
invoked Taft-Hartley and bought another eighty days during which media-
tion between the two sides could take place. 2' ° Truman would likely respond,
quite reasonably, that this extra eighty days on top of the previous hundreds
of days the two sides had to negotiate would not likely have led to an
agreement; 22' rather, it would likely have just pushed back the strike date.
While this is probably true, it misses a key element in the modified prelimi-
nary injunction framework. One of the reasons why we are tolerant of
executive forays into areas that are arguably outside the normal scope of the
president's power is because we recognize that sometimes it is necessary
that the president take these actions in order to confront or stave off an
213. Even the petitioner-steel companies concede as much. See Brief for Plaintiff Companies,
supra note 182, at 6.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 161-164.
215. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
216. Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 5; Brief for the Union, supra note 183,
at 9.
217. Brief of Respondent, supra note 209, at 79.
218. See Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 7-8.
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 176 (2006).
220. See Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 20-21.




emergency. If the president had invoked the statutory cooling off period,
he would have had eighty days to go to Congress and work with them to
fashion a solution to the problem. In short, there is reason to believe that
"[t]he emergency which caused the President to act ... was created by his
own failure to use procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act.' 223 This would seem to
weigh heavily against him.
It does not end there, however. Yet another mitigation argument would
focus on the government's strict maintenance of its "price stabilization pol-
icy." This piece of regulatory machinery listed the exact price, per ton, that
American steel companies could charge for the steel that they produced.'
24
Throughout the fruitless negotiations, it was quite clear to all parties in-
volved-the management,221 the union, 226 and the government217 -that the
matter preventing a new contract with the union's wage increases was the
government's firm insistence on no corresponding increase in the price of
steel. While it would be difficult to say that the president should have
changed the Office of Price Stabilization's policies with regard to the price
of steel to avert the strike, that he had the ability to do so does seem to fur-
ther undercut the claim to "emergency" status.
228
Third, we look to whether "the balance of harms weighed in favor of the
president.' '229 On the one hand, the president certainly had reason on his side
to claim that a nationwide strike at the steel mills would have harmed our
offensive efforts in the Korean War,230 "our defens[ive] efforts, ' 23 ' and our
222. See, e.g., Katyal & Caplan, supra note 4, at 1069; McDonald, supra note 3. See generally
supra Section II.B.
223. Brief for the Union, supra note 183, at 3; see also Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra
note 182, at 19 ("[T]he constitutional right of Congress to provide for emergencies is utterly frus-
trated by an executive procedure which awaits the creation of the emergency and then insists upon
disregarding the means which Congress has provided and using instead a means which is fashioned
exclusively by the Executive.").
224. Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 7.
225. See id. at 7-8.
226. Brief for the Union, supra note 183, at 14-17.
227. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 209, at 81 ("[W]e believe.., their real complaint is
with the denial of a price increase."); Brief for the Union, supra note 183, at 14-17 ("The reason
those negotiations have broken down is because we will not agree to a commensurate price increase
to offset the labor cost." (quoting S. 2999: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 82d Cong. 150-51 (1952) (statement of Mr. Arnall, Director of the Office of Price
Stabilization))).
228. It is also worth noting that there were other options at the president's disposal. For in-
stance, he could have seized any particular plant that "fail[ed] to comply with obligatory orders
placed by the Government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (citing Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-71(a) (2006))). He also could have followed the examples of
numerous presidents before him by calling on troops to break up the strike. See Brief of Respondent,
supra note 209, at 110-12.
229. See supra text accompanying note 95.





economy. On the other, the ability of the president to take substantially
less drastic actions to alleviate or even possibly eliminate the harm and the
emergency would seem to weigh against finding the balance of harms in his
favor.
2 33
As for the companies, their expected harms seemed to be quite substan-
tial. For one, the president's action meant that, in addition to losing control
of their steel mills for as long as "necessary or expedient in the interest of
national defense,'' 234 they effectively lost to the unions in the battle over
whether wages increased, all the while not winning the fight for higher steel
prices. In particular, given that the government was planning to negotiate
with the union to provide higher wages during the time it maintained control
of the mills, 235 it was unlikely that management would be able to return to
the bargaining table to lower those wages when it regained control.3 6 As to
steel price policy, the companies had an important bargaining chip with the
government in the form of allowing a walk out and disrupting the nation's
steel supply, a chip they were deprived of when the president seized the
mills. But, of course, the ability to have the government in a position with
its back against the wall is hardly the sort of interest that should weigh in
the company's favor.
One more brief fact cutting against the company's position is worth
mentioning. Not unlike the argument in the discussion about Merryman's
harm discussed above, Congress could have taken the action Truman did
in this case, 218 in which event the same harm would have resulted to the steel
mills. Is there something particularly pernicious about this harm coming
from an action taken by the president, then, rather than by Congress? Here
perhaps so. For one, the companies might well have had reasonable expecta-
tions of how the strike situation would be handled because of Congress's
extensive statutory action in this field, especially the Taft-Hartley Act. And
though it is conjecture, the steel companies might even have had an expecta-
tion against seizure because they thought Congress would be the
decisionmaker, and the steel industry's lobbying efforts guaranteed them
enough influence in that body to prevent something as drastic as seizure
from passing.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., supra notes 215-227 and accompanying text.
234. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. at 3141.
235. See Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 12.
236. See id.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 174-176.
238. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 ("Takings Clause"). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 31, 52 n.53 (1985) (reducing
takings doctrine to four simple questions, and discussing temporary takings).
239. See, e.g., Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American
Industrial Relations, 1935-1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REv. 45 (2006) (describing major industrial
works' intense lobbying efforts with regard to 1940s labor legislation).
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Finally, though in some ways this closely parallels the analysis under the
first standard, Congress also has interests that need to be balanced against
the president's in acting. Here, the separation of powers issue does not seem
as open to question as it did in Lincoln's suspension of the writ. '4 As Justice
Jackson noted, Truman would have to rely on the implied powers in Article
II, since even his "zone of twilight analysis" showed that "Congress has not
left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three
statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure. 24' Still, the president could
plausibly argue that, in light of the emergency situation, whatever specula-
tive harm would arise to Congress with regard to separation of powers does
not match the harm that would have resulted had he not acted to prevent the
strike.
242
Fourth, we ask whether "the president's action [was] taken in the public
interest. ' 243 This is probably Truman's best factor. It seems quite reasonable
to conclude that, from Truman's perspective, his action on April 8 was taken
to prevent a major strike that would be damaging to the war effort and the
national economy-two areas well entrenched in the public interest. One
sticking point for the president might be the charge that his action was moti-
vated not just to avert the strike, but also to provide wage concessions to
union workers in the steel industry.244 And maybe that was so. But, unless
Truman's primary motivation in seizing the mills was to provide these wage
increases (which even the steel companies do not claim in their brief2 45), that
his response to an emergency situation allowed him to give some benefits to
the union along the way would not seem to undercut the fact that it was
taken in the public interest."'
When looking at the four factors as a whole, it is not impossible, but im-
plausible to find that Truman acted with practical legitimacy. Even under the
alternative preliminary injunction test, it appears as if Truman only fully
satisfies the fourth factor; there are some major complications with all the
rest. For one, the existence of the Taft-Hartley Act, which Truman chose not
to use, hurts him, particularly under the first and second factors. It seems to
show congressional intent where it is difficult to infer otherwise; and, if em-
ployed, it could have reduced the damages or made the emergency go away,
at least long enough to get Congress involved.
Indeed, while the harm that Truman confronted on April 8 was undoubt-
edly substantial, his role in possibly turning an otherwise nonemergency
matter into an emergency is a major fact cutting against finding practical
240. See supra notes 167-174 and accompanying text.
241. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
242. After all, three members of the Court were not too troubled by separation of powers
concerns. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667-710 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
243. See supra text accompanying note 96.
244. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff Companies, supra note 182, at 11-12.
245. See id.
246. See supra Section I1B (discussing "primary motivation" in context of the fourth factor).
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legitimacy for his seizure. However, just as with Jefferson, who failed to
meet the threshold rule, failing to meet enough factors to satisfy the second
prong of the analysis should not be taken to mean that Truman could not act.
Rather, it means merely that by choosing to do so, he operated outside of
whatever legitimacy the modified preliminary injunction framework could
give him, and therefore subjected himself to full ex post review by Congress
or the public.247
CONCLUSION
This Note set out to achieve two goals: first, to show the similarity of the
function of equity in history and the function of executive power in the
United States; and, second, to show the practical insights to be gained by
applying the framework from one such equitable remedy, the preliminary
injunction, to questions of executive power. On the first point, we have seen,
for example, how the debate over the legitimacy of the King's use of equity
vis-A-vis the common law and the King's response that his right to provide
equitable justice was inherent or implied in his office parallel similar issues
in the current debate over the legitimate source and scope of executive pow-
er. We have also seen how, historically, equity was a useful escape
mechanism from an unbending common law-just as the extraordinary re-
sort to executive power in times of pressing national emergency has
historically functioned as an escape mechanism. On the second point, we
have seen how a general framework could be discerned from modem courts'
treatments of preliminary injunctions and translated into a workable frame-
work through which to examine questions of executive power. And, finally,
we have seen that framework put into practice in a variety of contexts. Jef-
ferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory highlighted the conceptual rigor
of the threshold status quo rule. Lincoln's limited suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus and Truman's seizure of the steel mills showcased the balanc-
ing of interests that results from the second prong standard-based analysis-
with the former showing an action that passes, and the latter showing one
that fails.
Throughout it all, the overriding point was to show that the modified
preliminary injunction framework borrowed from equity can be used to
gauge the practical legitimacy of an otherwise questionable executive action.
Finding executive action practically legitimate is, of course, not the same as
finding executive action constitutional. At the same time, the rigor of the
framework's analysis should mean that the president gains something from
passing it. Coupled with a plausible constitutional argument, the finding of
practical legitimacy might warrant deferring to the president on the legiti-
macy of his act, which would allow the president to avoid having to rely
exclusively on post hoc ratification. After all, just as problems in the com-
mon law at times required resorting to equity, sometimes a president needs
247. Cf supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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to act outside his normal bounds of power. There should be a principled yet
flexible way of determining when he can legitimately do so.
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